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1Review of Jean Buridan, Treatise on Consequences, translated
with an introduction by Stephen Read, editorial introduction by
Hubert Hubien (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. ISBN
978-0-8232-5718-8 (hardback). 185 pages.
In this book, Stephen Read gives the first translation into English of the
Treatise on Consequences by the French logician Jean Buridan, written in
the 1330s or 40s. John Buridan was one of the most important logicians in
the 14th-century, and his treatise on consequences one of his most important
works on logic. The value of this new translation, which makes his work
available to those who do not read Latin, cannot be overemphasized. When
I, as someone trained in contemporary logic who has spent the better part
of the last decade studying logical developments of the High Middle Ages —
the 13th to 14th centuries in particular — was asked if the present book was
one that readers of Studia Logica should know about, I gave an unhesitating
and unqualified yes. But the average reader of Studia Logica has probably
spent the last decade much differently from me, and probably sees that 14th-
century date and wants to know why she should be interested in something
almost 700 years old. Surely logic has moved on from where we were 700
years ago, surely there has been some progress in the field, so surely such a
treatise could be nothing more than a curiosity of history. (We could even
turn this into a syllogism, thus showing that if we were to go back into the
history of logic, Aristotle alone would do.)
In the course of this review, I will not only outline and summarize the
contents of the book, but I will also demonstrate why this is a book contem-
porary logicians should be interested in, even if they have no interest in the
history of logic, and why they could do far worse than starting here if they
are interested and wish to learn more. To quote from Read’s introduction:
“Buridan’s treatise on consequences is a highly original and influential study
of the concept of logical consequence. It moves not only beyond Aristotle’s
ideas, which had dominated medieval though, but also beyond the already
insightful developments of the logica modernorum [the ‘modern logic’, i.e.,
12th and 13th-century developments]” [p. 51]
The book comprises four parts. The first is Read’s introduction, which
provides an overview of Buridan’s views in a way that both provides the
necessary background to medieval logical and semantical theory necessary
to understand Buridan’s innovations as well as is often more clear, because
more verbose, than Buridan’s own exposition. The introduction is nearly
half the length of the treatise itself, and provides an indispensable guide
through the treatise, particularly for those readers who are not versed in
2medieval semantics or the technical terms used in logic in the 14th-century.
Given that there is yet no good modern introduction to medieval logic, this
introduction serves as a good interim measure.
The second part is Read’s translation of the editorial introduction that
Hubert Hubien wrote for his critical edition of the treatise, hitherto avail-
able only in French. This editorial introduction covers the manuscript and
incunabula tradition of the text, as well as questions of authorship, as earlier
20th-century commentators had questioned its attribution to Buridan. Hu-
bien demonstrates that the treatise is unequivocally Buridan’s, and also ar-
gues that it was written in 1335 (p. 57). Read, argues, however, that evidence
from the subject matter “favor[s] a date in the 1340s” (p. 5). Whichever date
is correct, when he composed this treatise, Buridan was an Arts Master at
the University of Paris, and thus was in regular contact with undergrad-
uates, all of whom were required to study logic before progressing to the
higher faculties of medicine, law, or theology. The treatise was immensely
popular with three incunabula editions from 1493, 1495, and 1499; the first
modern edition was Hubien’s from 1979 [p. 5]. But the treatise is not a
mere textbook for undergrads; rather, it is a highly technical development
of the central notion, that of ‘consequence’, in the logical sense of the word.
The third part of the book is the translation of the treatise itself, about
which more below, and it is followed by the fourth part: endnotes (yes,
sadly, endnotes rather than footnotes; there is also no separate bibliogra-
phy, so citations must be located by skimming the endnotes until they are
found), a glossary of terms that the person unfamiliar with medieval logic
will find very useful [pp. 177–180], and an index of persons and concepts
[pp. 181–185].
The treatise itself is divided into four books: The first discusses first conse-
quences in general and then the special case of consequences between asser-
toric propositions. The second covers modal consequences. The topic of the
third is syllogisms with assertoric propositions, and the fourth is on modal
syllogisms. In each book, Buridan begins by defining the relevant concepts
and terms and then, on the basis of these, proving a number of conclusions
(i.e., theorems) that follow from these definitions.
What is a ‘consequence’? More specifically, what does Buridan mean
by ‘consequence’, and how does it relate to our contemporary notion of
logical consequence? In Book I, ch. 3 Buridan gives a syntactic definition of
‘consequence’:
A consequence is a compound [i.e., not subject-predicate] proposi-
tion, for it is constituted from several propositions conjoined by the
3expression ‘if’ or the expression ‘therefore’ or something equivalent
[p. 66].
This purely syntactic definition is revised soon after to add a semantic com-
ponent, so that only those compound if-then statements which are true will
be called ‘consequences’. When discussing the truth-conditions of conse-
quences, Buridan begins by outlining other peoples’ views:
Many say that of two propositions one is antecedent to the other if it
is impossible for the one to be true without the other being true, and
one is consequent to the other if it is impossible for the one not to be
true when the other is true, so that every proposition is antecedent
to every other proposition for which it is impossible for it to be true
without the other being true [p. 67].
He rejects this definition, because “Every human is running, so some human
is running” is a good (or true) consequence, but it does not meet the above
definition. Why not? Because truth, for Buridan and other nominalists,
attaches to proposition-tokens rather than proposition-types, and if some-
one creates a token “Every human is running” without creating a token of
the other proposition, the consequent will not be true, since it doesn’t ex-
ist. He next considers a definition of consequence which avoids this problem
by adding the caveat “when they [the antecedent and the consequent] are
formed together” [p. 67], but this is also problematic, because “No propo-
sition is negative, so no ass is running” is not a good consequence, and yet
when both propositions are formed, it is impossible for the antecedent to be
true, so it is impossible for both the antecedent to be true and the conse-
quent false. (To see that “No proposition is negative” is necessarily false,
when formed, note that this very proposition is itself a negative proposition.)
A third definition is offered:
[O]ne proposition is antecedent to another, which is such that it is
impossible for things to be altogether as it signifies unless they are
altogether as the other signifies when they are proposed together
[p. 67].
This option is rejected because “it assumes that every true proposition is
true because things are altogether as it signifies” [p. 67], an assumption that
was earlier denied:
Some claim that every true proposition is true because things are
altogether as it signifies they are, namely, in the thing or things
4signified in reality. [But this is not so] Because if Colin’s horse, who
cantered well, is dead, “Colin’s horse cantered well” is true, but things
are not in reality as the proposition signifies, because the things have
perished” [p. 63].
Buridan gives other, similar, examples where truth of a proposition and
things being altogether as the proposition signifies come apart, but then
goes on to say that with appropriate provisos, we can adopt a notion of
truth along these lines, and hence also a notion of logical consequence of
this type [p. 67].
With his definition in hand, Buridan next sets out different divisions
of consequences, the first of which is into material consequences and for-
mal consequences. A formal consequence is one which is “valid in all terms
retaining a similar form” while a material one is “one where not every propo-
sition similar in form would be a good consequence, or, as it is commonly
put, which does not hold in all terms retaining the same form” [p. 68]. Ma-
terial consequences are further divided into those which are simply good,
“since it is not possible for the antecedent to be true the consequent be-
ing false”, and those which are merely good as-of-now, “things being as a
matter of fact as they are” [p. 68]. Formal consequences are divided into
two types at the beginning of the third book, where syllogistic consequences
(i.e., syllogisms) are distinguished from ones which are consequences “from
one simple subject-predicate to one simple subject-predicate [proposition]”,
or which are a conjunct from a conjunction or a disjunction from a disjunct
[p. 113]. The remainder of the first book is dedicated to these non-syllogistic
formal consequences without modalities.
The second book addresses modal propositions, and the inferential rules
that apply to them. Buridan begins by weighing in on the question of what
counts as a modal proposition. He, like many other medieval logicians,
accepts a wide range of modalities, but in this chapter focuses only on the
alethic ones: the “modals of possibility and impossibility, of necessity and
contingency, and of truth and falsity” [p. 95]. The first point he makes is
that “propositions are not said to be of necessity or of possibility in that
they are possible or necessary, but from the fact that the modes ‘possible’ or
‘necessary’ occur in them. . . So a proposition can indeed be necessary when
it is not one of necessity”, i.e., when it is not a modal proposition [p. 95].
For example “A human is an animal” is necessary, but it is an assertoric
proposition; conversely “A human of necessity runs” is a modal proposition,
but it is not necessary, rather, it is false and impossible [p. 95]. This focus on
the syntactic construction of the proposition mirrors his approach to defining
5consequences. It is in this book that we see Buridan’s take on the de dicto/de
re issue — though in his case, he frames it in terms of the more-usual-for-the-
14th-century language of‘divided sense’ vs. ‘composite sense’. A composite
modal proposition is one which combines a mode and another proposition
such that the mode is the subject and the proposition is the predicate, or
vice versa. For example “That a human runs is possible” is a composite
modal proposition [p. 96]. A divided modal proposition is also formed out
of a mode and another proposition, but neither is the subject and neither
is the predicate; rather, part of the proposition is the subject, part is the
predicate, and the mode comes in between them. For example, “A human
is possibly running” is a divided modal proposition [p. 96]. Some medieval
authors favor one of these constructions over the other, calling one of them
the true modals and dismissing the others as not really modal; Buridan, on
the other hand, considers both types equally and devotes the remainder of
Book II to the rules of inferences that govern both types.
Buridan’s treatment of composite modal propositions is distinctive, and
worthy of a special note here. When he discusses composite modal propo-
sitions in ch. 7 of Book II, he uses examples such as “Every possibility is
that B is A”, which, on the face of it, can also be interpreted as a stan-
dard universal affirmative assertoric proposition, with ‘possibility’ being the
subject term and ‘that B is A’ the predicate; and this construction must be
distinguished from ones such as “Every B being A is a possibility”, wherein
‘Every B being A’ is the subject term and the entire proposition is indefinite,
rather than universal [pp. 105–106]. This means that there is an ambigu-
ity between “(Every A is B) is possible” and “Every (A is B) is possible”.
This ambiguity must be attended to when determining the legitimacy of
inferences.
The final two books address syllogistic consequences. Here, Buridan goes
beyond Aristotle by considering sentences with “non-normal” conclusions,
that is, where the predicate comes before the copula. A “normal” conclusion
would be one like “Socrates is an animal”, while its non-normal form would
be “Socrates an animal is”. Such examples illustrate one of the difficulties
of translating a logical text written in a ‘natural’ language, rather than a
symbolic one∗: Latin syntax is much more free than English syntax, and in
some cases it is impossible to translate Buridan’s Latin sentences into English
ones that maintain the required distinctions and are grammatical. Read does
∗Many historians of medieval logic have argued that the Latin which is used is no
longer natural-language-Latin, but is rather a semi-formal or regimented language. We
don’t wish to deny this here by calling Buridan’s Latin ‘natural’; we simply are trying to
distinguish between logic written in symbols and logic written in words.
6an admirable job navigating between the Scylla of ungrammaticality and the
Charybdis of nonsense.
When considering modal syllogisms, Buridan extends his scope to con-
sider intensional words, and there treats with issues familiar to contempo-
rary treatments of such terms. For example, the 3rd conclusion of Book
IV is that composite modal consequences with epistemic modalities are not
closed under consequence, thereby avoiding the problem of logical omni-
science [p. 142].
By the foregoing I hope to have given readers a taste of what can be
found in the treatise, and to whet their appetite for more. Now I must
speak to some of the negatives. Buridan is attempting to articulate some
extremely subtle and complicated logical notions and he’s doing so with
impoverished means. Though he proceeds from definitions to theorems and
proofs, and his conclusions are derived on case-by-case bases. As a result,
his methods are not easily generalizable, and, reading the treatise, one may
be left wondering whether adequate foundations for his systems of logic can
be found. Recently, contemporary logicians have tackled exactly this worry;
I point the reader to [2] and [1] for two formal reconstructions. Thus, setting
aside worries concerning the success of Buridan’s project, there is nothing
left for me to do but enthusiastically and whole-heartedly recommend this
entire book — text and commentary — to anyone interested in the concept
of logical consequence, modal logic, or the history of logic.
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